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COMMENTARY 
FINLEY v. UNITED STATES: UNSTRINGING PENDENT 
JURISDICTION 
Wendy Collins Perdue* 
SHORTLY after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins1 was decided, then Professor Felix Frankfurter wrote President Roosevelt stating: "I 
certainly didn't expect to live to see the day when the Court would 
announce, as they [sic] did on Monday, that it itself has usurped 
power for nearly a hundred years. And think of not a single New 
York paper-at least none that I saw-having a nose for the signifi-
cance of such a decision."2 This sentiment captures my reaction to 
the Court's recent decision in Finley v. United States. 3 
Finley involves so-called "pendent-party" jurisdiction.4 Barbara 
Finley's husband and two of her children had been killed when the 
airplane they were traveling in struck electric transmission lines dur-
ing its approach to a San Diego airfield. Ms. Finley brought a Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit in federal court against the Federal 
Aviation Administration. She later sought to amend her complaint to 
add state tort law claims against the city and the utility company that 
maintained the lines. Although there was no independent basis for 
jurisdiction over her state law claims, the district court found it had 
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Mark 
Tushnet and William Eskridge for their comments on earlier drafts and to Kandis Koustenis 
for her research assistance. 
I 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
2 Roosevelt and Frankfurter: Their Correspondence 1928-1945, 456 (M. Freedman ed. 
1967) [hereinafter M. Freedman], quoted in C. Wright, Federal Courts 355 n.12 (4th ed. 
1983). 
3 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989). 
4 In Finley, the Court defines pendent-party jurisdiction as "jurisdiction over parties not 
named in any claim that is independently cognizable by the federal court." 109 S. Ct. at 2006; 
see Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 753 (1978); Note, Unravelling the "Pendent 
Party" Controversy: A Revisionist Approach to Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 64 B.U.L. 
Rev. 895 (1985). 
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pendent jurisdiction and then certified· the issue of jurisdiction for 
interlocutory appeal. 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit summarily reversed, 6 and the Supreme Court in a 5-4 
decision affirmed that reversal. 
Although the Court might have limited its holding to peculiarities 
of the FTCA or suits involving the United States/ it instead used 
broad language that could potentially invalidate all pendent-party 
jurisdiction absent explicit statutory authority. 8 Even more surprising 
than its broad treatment of pendent-party jurisdiction were the 
Court's comments on pendent-claim jurisdiction. The Court 
described pendent-claim jurisdiction as inconsistent with what it 
called the "rudimentary" principle that federal court jurisdiction 
exists only if it is conferred by Congress. 9 Despite having declared 
pendent-claim jurisdiction to be completely lacking a statutory foun-
dation, the Court declined to take the logical next step to limit or 
impair that doctrine. 10 Thus, in essence what the Court did was to 
announce that it has been unconstitutionally usurping power for years 
but that it was not going to do anything about this, at least for now. 
s Finley v. United States, No. 86-1151 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 1987), in Appendix to Petition for 
Certiorari at A5-Al0, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (87-1973). 
6 Finley v. City of San Diego & United States, No. 87-6091 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 1988), in 
Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at AI, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (87-
1973). 
7 In its brief, the government argued that the FfCA was intended to function like the 
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 149l(a)(l), which does not permit private defendants to 
be joined with the United States as a party. See Brief for the United States at 22-24, Finley v. 
United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 87-1973); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 
(1941). Although the Court noted its prior holding in Sherwood construing the Tucker Act, 
109 S. Ct. at 2008, it didn't discuss whether Congress intended the two acts to operate 
similarly. The government also argued that because the Federal Tort Claims Act is a waiver of 
sovereign immunity it should be narrowly construed. Brief for the United States at 20-22, 
Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 87-1973). The Court did not address this 
argument. 
s 109 S. Ct. at 2010. 
9 Id. at 2006; see Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 
1987 Duke L.J. 34, 37 (noting that the Constitution sets outer boundaries of federal 
jurisdiction, but with respect to the lower federal courts "[t]his jurisdiction is not self 
executing; Congress must prescribe it"); Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on 
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 
25 (1981) (indicating that "[c]ourts and commentators agree that Congress' discretion in 
granting jurisdiction to the lower federal courts implies that those courts take jurisdiction from 
Congress and not from Article III"). 
10 109 S. Ct. at 2010. 
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The approach adopted by the Court calls into question not only 
pendent-claim jurisdiction but ancillary jurisdiction as well. Particu-
larly vulnerable to attack are those uses of ancillary jurisdiction that 
involve the addition of new parties such as class action, intervention, 
and impleader. Furthermore, the opinion may lay a foundation for 
attacking ancillary-claim jurisdiction involving counterclaims or 
cross-claims. This commentary will examine Finley and the potential 
impact of the opinion on the various permutations of ancillary and 
pendent jurisdiction. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANCILLARY AND PENDENT 
JURISDICTION 
Before examining the Court's rationale in Finley, it will be useful to 
outline some of the history of the development of the doctrines of 
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The federal courts have long rec-
ognized that there are occasions when they may hear claims over 
which there is no independent federal jurisdiction. This situation 
arises when those claims are joined with other claims that are prop-
erly before the court. 11 This type of jurisdiction is usually labeled 
either "ancillary" or "pendent" jurisdiction. Under traditional usage, 
"pendent" is the label used to describe jurisdiction exercised over 
nonfederal claims asserted by a plaintiff, while "ancillary" is the label 
used for jurisdiction over claims or parties joined by someone other 
than the plaintiff. 12 
This description of the terms' linguistic usage does not explain why 
there is any practical need to distinguish between situations based on 
whether a claim is raised by the plaintiff or by someone else. One 
II For a discussion of the historical development of ancillary jurisdiction, see 13 C. Wright, 
A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3523 (1982); Matasar, A Pendent 
and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 
U.C.D.L Rev. 103, 141-45 (1983). For a discussion of the historical development of pendent 
jurisdiction, see 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra,§§ 3567-3567.2; Matasar, supra, 
at 119-24. 
12 See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 2.14, at 77-78 (1985); G. 
Shreve & P. Raven-Hansen, Understanding Civil Procedure 129 (1989); Matasar, supra note 
11, at 117-18. This traditional distinction between ancillary and pendent jurisdiction explains 
the usage of the terms in most but not all situations. It has, for example, been suggested that 
counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims by a plaintiff should be called "ancillary." 
J. Cound, J. Friedenthal, A. Miller & J. Sexton, Civil Procedure, Cases and Materials 260 (4th 
ed. 1985); Fraser, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Actions Involving Multiple Claims, 76 
F.R.D. 525, 539 (1977). 
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explanation is purely historical. As discussed below, there are two 
distinct lines of cases, each of which has traditionally carried a sepa-
rate label. Beyond history, the usual explanation for treating claims 
joined by a plaintiff differently from claims joined by others is that 
there are more compelling fairness reasons for allowing defendants or 
others involuntarily brought before the court to raise their nonfederal 
claims. 13 As the Supreme Court has observed, "ancillary jurisdiction 
typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against 
his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost 
unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court.'* 
By contrast, efficiency and convenience, rather than fairness are the 
traditional justifications for allowing a plaintiff to join a pendent state 
claim to her federal claim. 15 Fairness considerations are less signifi-
cant with respect to the plaintiff because it is the plaintiff who has 
chosen the federal forum with its more limited jurisdiction. 
This differentiation is not completely satisfactory. As Professor 
Richard Matasar has observed, "One person's convenience is another 
person's faimess.'' 16 For example, the different treatment for pur-
poses of ancillary jurisdiction of compulsory and permissive counter-
claims17 suggests that the "unfairness" rationale is closely tied to 
efficiency. 18 It is unfair to force a defendant to endure a separate trial 
for her counterclaim only if that separate trial would entail some inef-
ficiency. Just as the fairness concern in most ancillary jurisdiction 
cases is closely linked to efficiency, the efficiency argument in pendent 
jurisdiction is closely linked to fairness. Having granted plaintiffs the 
option of pursuing a claim in federal court, one can argne that it is 
unfair to burden the exercise of that option with the burden of having 
to litigate two related claims in different places. 19 This fairness argn-
13 See G. Shreve & P. Raven-Hansen, supra note 12, at 120-21; Comment, Pendent and 
Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 1263, 1267, 
1269 (1975). . 
14 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978). 
IS See G. Shreve & P. Raven-Hansen, supra note 12, at 120; Matasar, supra note 11, at 152; 
Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 
15 Nw. U.L. Rev. 245, 278 (1980); Comment, supra note 13, at 1269. 
16 Matasar, supra note 11, at 153. 
17 See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 11, § 3523, at 11)7-09; Matasar, 
Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs 
Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1399, 1472 (1983). 
18 See Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. Tex. L.J. 1, 5 (1985). 
19 See id. at 4; Schenkier, supra note 15, at 255. 
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ment is particularly strong where the federal claim concerns a matter 
over which there is exclusive federal jurisdiction providing the plain-
tiff no choice of forum. It is increasingly argued that there is no 
meaningful distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction20 
and commentators have urged that the two terms be abandoned in 
favor of one generic label such as "extended,"21 "supplemental,"22 or 
"incidental"23 jurisdiction. 
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction 
The earliest ancillary jurisdiction cases involved claims to property 
within a federal court's exclusive control. For example, in Freeman v. 
Howe/4 the Supreme Court held that where property had been seized 
by a federal marshal under a federal writ of attachment, mortgagees 
could intervene in the federal court action regardless of whether they 
were diverse from the parties to that action. The Court explained that 
the claims of the intervenors would be "ancillary and dependent, sup-
plementary merely to the original suit, out of which it had arisen, and 
... maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the 
parties."25 In a 1925 case, the Court described the scope of ancillary 
jurisdiction as follows: 
The general rule is that when a federal court has properly acquired 
jurisdiction over a cause, it may entertain, by intervention, dependent 
or ancillary controversies; but no controversy can be regarded as 
dependent or ancillary unless it has direct relation to property or 
assets actually or constructively drawn into the court's possession or 
2o See Matasar, supra note 11, at 150-57; Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary 
Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory oflncidental Jurisdiction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1935, 1937 (1982); 
Comment, supra note 13, at 1271-87. The Supreme Court has declined to state specifically 
whether pendent and ancillary jurisdiction constitute a single doctrine, see Aldinger v. 
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (finding "little profit in attempting to decide ... whether there 
are any 'principled' differences" between the two), but it has described them as part of "the 
sa!lle generic problem." Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978). 
Lower courts have demonstrated some confusion about proper usage of the two terms. See, 
e.g., County of Oakland v. City of Berkeley, 742 F.2d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 1984) (court expresses 
doubt whether lower court exercised pendent or ancillary jurisdiction); By-Prod Corp. v. 
Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing extended jurisdiction over 
defendant's counterclaim as "pendent jurisdiction"). 
21 G. Shreve & P. Raven-Hansen, supra note 12, at 119. 
22 Freer, supra note 9, at 34. 
23 Note, supra note 20, at 1935. 
24 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). 
25 Id. at 460. 
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control by the principal suit. 26 
One year later, in 1926, in the case of Moore v. New York Cotton 
Exchange,27 the Supreme Court expanded this relatively narrow con-
cept of ancillary jurisdiction. In Moore, the plaintiff had sought 
injunctive relief under a federal antitrust claim and the defendant had 
counterclaimed based upon state law. The Supreme Court held that 
the federal courts had jurisdiction over the state counterclaim because 
the connection between the claim and counterclaim was so close "that 
it only needs the failure of the former to establish a foundation for the 
latter."28 
Following the adoption of the Federal Ru1es of Civil Procedure, 
lower courts and commentators have come to assume that there is 
ancillary jurisdiction coextensive with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure29 in cases involving Rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaims,30 
Rule 13(g) cross-claims,31 Rule 14 impleader,32 and Rule 24(a) inter-
vention of right. 33 The Supreme Court has never squarely held that 
ancillary jurisdiction extends to the full extent of the Federal Rules in 
these contexts, although it has in dicta suggested that it does. 34 
26 Fulton Nat'I Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925). 
27 270 u.s. 593 (1926). 
28 I d. at 610. 
29 See Matasar, supra note I I, at 144. 
30 See, e.g., Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961); 
6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1414 (1990). 
31 See, e.g., LASA Per L'lndustria Del Marmo Soc. Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 
146 (6th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1966); 6 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & M. Kane, supra note 30, at § 1433; Fraser, supra note 12, at 526-30. 
32 See, e.g., H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967); Dery v. 
Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959); 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 30, 
§ 1444, at 312-19; Fraser, supra note 12, at 535. 
33 See, e.g., Smith Petroleum Serv. v. Monsanto Chern. Co., 420 F.2d I 103, I 113-14 (5th 
Cir. 1970); Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d 666, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1957); 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & 
M. Kane, supra note 30, § 1917 (1986). 
34 In Moor v. County of Alameda, 41 I U.S. 693 (1973), the Court refers to "the well-
established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of compulsory counterclaims under 
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a) and 13(h), and in the context of third-party claims under Fed. 
Rule Civ. Proc. 14(a)." ld. at 714-15 (footnote omitted); see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. 
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 (1978) (indicating that "the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over 
nonfederal claims has often been upheld in situations involving impleader, cross-claims or 
counterclaims"); Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.l (1974) (discussing 
ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a)). 
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B. Pendent Jurisdiction 
The origins of modem pendent jurisdiction date back to Siler v. 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,35 and Hurn v. Oursler.36 In Siler, a 
state order regulating rates was challenged as a violation of state and 
federal constitutional law. The Court held that the presence of the 
federal questions gave the federal courts jurisdiction to decide all the 
issues raised in the case, including the state law issues. 37 The Court 
further declared that where state issues are combined with federal 
constitutional issues it is preferable to decide the case on state 
grounds and avoid unnecessary determinations of federal constitu-
tional questions. 38 Although Siler established that at least in some 
circumstances the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide state 
issues raised by a plaintiff, the Court did not address what type of 
relationship must exist between the state claim and the jurisdiction-
ally sufficient federal claim, the issue addressed in Hurn. In Hurn, the 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin production of defendants' play alleging 
copyright infringement under federal law and two counts of unfair 
competition under state law. The district court dismissed the copy-
right claim on the merits and then dismissed the two state claims for 
want of jurisdiction.39 The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding 
that where a state claim and federal claim were ''but different grounds 
asserted in support of the same cause of action,"40 the federal court 
had jurisdiction over both claims. Where, however, the claim consti-
tuted "two separate and distinct causes of action," there was jurisdic-
tion only over the federal "cause of action."41 
Applying this test that relied on the concept of "cause of action" 
proved difficult, and in the 1966 landmark case of United Mine Work-
ers v. Gibbs, 42 the Court offered a broader and more functional 
approach to pendent jurisdiction. In Gibbs, the Court held that a 
plaintiff with a claim arising under federal law may also join a state 
claim, even if there is no diversity, provided the two claims "derive 
35 213 u.s. 175 (1909). 
36 289 u.s. 238 (1933). 
37 213 U.S. at 193. 
38 Id. 
39 289 U.S. at 239-40. 
40 Id. at 247. 
41 Id. at 248. 
42 383 u.s. 715 (1966). 
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from a common nucleus of operative fact."43 This basic test for pen-
dent jurisdiction continues to this day. 
C. The Focus on the Sources of the Courts' Authority in More 
Recent Cases 
Until Gibbs, none of the cases involving either ancillary or pendent 
jurisdiction focused on the question of the source of the courts' 
authority to exercise such jurisdiction. In Gibbs, the Court offered a 
partial explanation. The Court explained that constitutional author-
ity existed to hear such claims because they constituted one "case" 
within the meaning of Article III.44 Notably absent from Gibbs was 
any discussion of statutory authority to hear such claims. This 
absence has led some to describe supplemental jurisdiction as "judi-
cially created jurisdiction,"45 in apparent violation of the long-estab-
lished principle that jurisdiction in the lower federal courts must be 
supported by a statutory authorization.46 However, as others have 
pointed out, 47 rather than assume that the federal courts have been 
acting for years in blatant violation of this fundamental principle, one 
could make a strong argument that statutory authority already exists. 
Just as constitutional authority was found in the word "cases" in 
Article III, statutory authority could be found in the words "civil 
actions"48 or "case,"49 which appear in most of the jurisdictional stat-
utes. Of course, jurisdictional statutes do not have to be interpreted 
to be coextensive with the Constitution. The language in both the 
43 Id. at 725. 
44 I d. Gibbs established the outer limits of constitutional power but also held that the courts 
may, as a matter of discretion, decline to exercise that power. See id. at 726. 
45 J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 12, at§§ 2.12-.14; see F. James & G. 
Hazard, Civil Procedure § 2.7, at 61-62 (3d ed. 1985) (ancillary and pendent jurisdiction 
"product[s] of decisional law rather than statute"). 
46 See, e.g., The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867); Ex Parte Bollman, 8 
U.S. (4 Crruich) 75, 93 (1807). 
47 See H. Fink & M. Tushnet, Federal Jurisdiction: Policy and Practice 433 n.5 (2d ed. 
1987); Currie, supra note 4, at 754; Freer, supra note 9, at 56-58. 
48 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). As part of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, 
the phrase "civil action" was substituted throughout the provisions governing district court 
jurisdiction. See Pub. L. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 930 (1948). According to the Reviser's Notes, the 
purpose of this change was to bring the language into conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 2. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app. All4-Al25 (1947) (reviser's notes). The Finley 
majority concludes that this change was merely stylistic. 109 S. Ct. at 2009; see id. at 2018 
n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
49 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 133l(a), 1334(a). 
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diversity50 and federal question51 jurisdictional statutes has been con-
strued to be less expansive than the nearly identical language in the 
Constitution. Also, the phrase "civil actions" could be interpreted 
differently in different jurisdictional statutes. Nonetheless, these 
words provide an easy and logical statutory basis for supplemental 
jurisdiction. 
Given that the Court in Gibbs found that it had jurisdiction over 
the pendent claims but discussed only constitutional authority, Gibbs 
could be interpreted to have implicitly held that the statutory grant 
was coextensive with the constitutional grant. 52 However, several 
subsequent cases made clear that, in at least some circumstances, this 
was not the case. 
In Aldinger v. Howard, 53 Ms. Aldinger brought a section 1983 civil 
rights action against her former boss, the Spokane County Treasurer. 
She also joined Spokane County as a defendant alleging a purely state-
law theory of vicarious liability. She could not sue the county under 
section 1983 because the part of Monroe v. Pape54 exempting munici-
palities from liability had not yet been overruled. 55 The Court held 
that it had no jurisdiction over the state-law claim against the 
county. 56 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court focused for the first time on 
the need for a statutory basis for pendent jurisdiction, at least when 
additional parties are involved. It announced the rule that before a 
federal court may exercise pendent-party jurisdiction, it "must satisfy 
itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in the stat-
utes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication 
50 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
51 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
52 See H. Fink & M. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 433 n.5. 
53 427 u.s. 1 (1976). 
54 365 u.s. 167 (1961). 
55 In Monroe l'. Pape, the Court reviewed the legislative history of§ 1983 and concluded 
that Congress did not intend the section to apply to suits against municipal corporations. 365 
U.S. at 187. In Aldinger, the Court relied on Monroe v. Pape for its conclusion that Congress 
did not want counties brought into federal court as pendent parties to a § 1983 action. 
Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16 n.11. Two years after Aldinger, in Monell v. New York City Dept. of 
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Court overruled Monroe v. Pape, concluding that it had 
misread the legislative history and that in fact Congress did intend counties to be subject to 
suit under § 1983. Id. at 690. 
56 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 19. 
548 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 76:539 
negated its existence."57 The Court also turned its attention to the 
meaning of "civil action" as that phrase is used in the jurisdictional 
grant of section 1343(3).58 The Court concluded that a broad con-
struction of "civil action" that allowed counties to be sued in federal 
court as part of a section 1983 action would be inconsistent with the 
congressional desire to exclude counties from the reach of section 
1983.59 The Court stressed that it was not laying down "any sweep-
ing pronouncement upon the existence or exercise" of pendent-party 
jurisdiction, 60 and noted by way of example that in cases of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction, pendent-party jurisdiction might be available. 61 
In focusing on the need for a statutory foundation for pendent juris-
diction, the Court acknowledged that Gibbs and its predecessors had 
not addressed this issue. 62 The Court then offered the largely unex-
plained63 and completely unnecessary suggestion that a statutory 
foundation was not required for pendent claims. According to the 
Court, in the area of pendent-claim jurisdiction, "the way was ... left 
open for the Court to fashion its own rules under the general language 
of Art. 111."64 Nonetheless, two years later in Owen Equipment and 
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 65 the Court appeared to move toward a more 
unified treatment for all types of supplemental jurisdiction. The case 
involved a wrongful death action brought by Ms. Kroger against the 
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) in connection with the death 
of her husband. The suit was brought in federal court and based on 
diversity. After OPPD impleaded Owen Equipment, Ms. Kroger 
amended her complaint to add Owen Equipment as a defendant. Ms. 
Kroger and Owen Equipment were not diverse, and the Supreme 
Court held that there was no jurisdiction over that claim. 
The Court's analysis began with the observation that ancillary and 
pendent jurisdiction are part of "the sam~ generic problem: Under 
57 Id. at 18. 
58 Id. at 17. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 18. 
6t Id. 
62 Id. 
63 In drawing a distinction between pendent claims and pendent parties, the Court offered 
practical differences between the two, id. at 14, but it did not explain why these differences 
altered the requirement for a statutory foundation. 
64 Id. at 15. 
65 437 u.s. 365 (1978). 
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what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law 
claim arising between citizens of the same state?"66 The Court then 
turned to Gibbs, commenting that the court of appeals in Kroger had 
"failed to understand the scope of the doctrine of the Gibbs case."67 
In delineating the scope of Gibbs, the Court drew no distinction 
between pendent parties and pendent claims. Instead, the Court 
stressed that Gibbs had simply determined the boundaries of constitu-
tional power. In addition, the Court noted, it was also always neces-
sary to determine whether there was statutory authority for pendent 
jurisdiction. 68 The Court then went on to articulate what appeared to 
be a general statutory test to judge all assertions of pendent or ancil-
lary jurisdiction, noting that, 
[T]here must be an examination of the posture in which the 
nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers 
jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order to determine whether 
"Congress in [that statute] has . . . expressly or by implication 
negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal 
claim.69 
Applying this test the Court found no jurisdiction. The Court con-
cluded that pendent jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the · 
clearly demonstrated "congressional mandate that diversity jurisdic-
tion is not to be available when any plaintiff is a citizen of the same 
State as any defendant."70 By allowing a plaintiff to use pendent juris-
diction to sue a nondiverse party, pendent jurisdiction could com-
pletely eliminate the total diversity rule. As long as there is diversity 
between one plaintiff and one defendant, all other claims could be 
considered pendent. Of course, Kroger involved a claim by a plaintiff 
against an impleaded third party, but the Court concluded that this 
66 Id. at 370. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 371-72. 
69 Id. at 373 (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18). 
70 Id. at 374. It is worth noting that the "congressional mandate" for the complete diversity 
rule is not found on the face of§ 1332. Rather, the Court found that mandate in the fact that, 
following Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), Congress repeatedly reenacted 
the diversity statute without saying that it meant to change the complete diversity rule 
enunciated in Strawbridge. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373. Thus, in finding no pendent 
jurisdiction, the Court engages in a kind of stacking of implied congressional mandates. 
Having found an implied congressional endorsement of the complete diversity rule, the Court 
then implies from this implied endorsement that Congress also meant to negate pendent 
jurisdiction. 
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still provided too easy a circumvention of the complete diversity rule 
to have been contemplated by Congress. 71 The Court took some pains 
to suggest in dicta that the diversity statute might authorize jurisdic-
tion over a claim between nondiverse parties in other circumstances. 
Specifically, the Court appeared to reaffirm in dicta the traditional 
understanding that there is jurisdiction over a claim between a 
defendant and a nondiverse impleaded third party. 72 
The result in Kroger is consistent with the analysis in another case, 
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 73 where the Court held that, in a 
diversity class action, the claim of each member of the plaintiff class 
must independently satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. 
Although the majority's analysis was not framed in terms of pendent 
or ancillary jurisdiction, 74 the approach is strikingly similar to that in 
Kroger. The Court stressed that for more than a century section 
1332(a) has been interpreted to require that the separate claim of each 
plaintiff must meet the amount in controversy requirement. 75 As in 
Kroger, invoking pendent or ancillary jurisdiction would have been 
completely contrary to the Court's interpretation of the rest of the 
jurisdictional grant. 
Following Kroger, the lower courts began doing two things. First, 
courts in every circuit16 except the Ninth 77 acknowledged that pen-
dent-party jurisdiction was permissible in at least some cases. Second, 
71 437 U.S. at 374; see Currie, supra note 4, at 765 n.76. 
72 Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376. 
73 414 u.s. 291, 301 (1973). 
74 Justice Brennan in dissent argued that jurisdiction should be available under a theory of 
ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 305-08. 
75 Id. at 294-95. 
76 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 838 F.2d 1157 (11th Cir. 1988); Price v. Pierce, 823 
F.2d 1114 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1222 (1988); Stewart v. United States, 716 
F.2d 755 (lOth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); North Dakota v. Merchants Nat'l 
Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1980); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Otero, 598 F.2d 
627 (1st Cir. 1979); Koppers Co. v. Garling & Langlois, 594 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1979); Dick 
Meyers Towing Serv. v. United States, 517 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 
908 (1979); Kline v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 1386 (M.D. Pa. 1984); Murphy v. United 
States, 451 F. Supp. 544 (D.D.C. 1978); Santoni v'"" United States, 450 F. Supp. 608 (D. Md. 
1978). 
77 See, e.g., Carpenters S. Calif. Admin. Corp. v. D. & L. Camp Constr. Co., 738 F.2d 999 
(9th Cir. 1984); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982); Munoz v. Small 
Business Admin., 644 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1981); Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th 
Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). 
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the Court's admonition in Kroger that one always had to consider 
whether there was a statutory basis for jurisdiction began to carry 
over into pendent78 and ancillary79 claim jurisdiction. These two lines 
of lower court cases do in fact reflect a relatively coherent way of 
combining Gibbs, Aldinger, and Kroger. The principle that seemed to 
emerge was that, in all cases in which a federal court was asked to 
exercise jurisdiction over a claim for which there was no independent 
basis for jurisdiction, the court had to consider both whether jurisdic-
tion was constitutional and whether it was statutorily authorized. As 
to the statutory analysis, in essence, the Court construed the jurisdic-
tional statutes to authorize full constitutional authority with respect 
to pendent and ancillary jurisdiction except where allowing it seems 
inconsistent with the particular jurisdictional statute itself or, in the 
case of suits based on federal questions, where pendent or ancillary 
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the 
underlying cause of action. 
II. FINLEY V. UNITED STATES 
In light of all of these precedents, Finley seemed to present a strong 
case for pendent jurisdiction. The original claim was one over which 
the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction. Not only had Aldinger 
specifically mentioned exclusive jurisdiction as a category of cases in 
which pendent-party jurisdiction might be appropriate, but jurisdic-
tion seemed completely consistent with the rationale in Kroger. 
Where there is exclusive federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff does not 
have the option of litigating the entire case in state court. Moreover, 
there was no reason to believe that allowing pendent jurisdiction was 
78 See, e.g., Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 552 (lOth Cir. 1986); 
Thompkins v. Stuttgart School Dist. No. 22, 787 F.2d 439, 441-42 (8th Cir. 1986); United 
States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 438-41 (7th Cir. 1982); Ortiz v. United States, 
595 F.2d 65,71-73 (lst Cir. 1979); Davis v. Devereux Found., 644 F. Supp. 482,487 (E.D. Pa. 
1986); Lage v. Thomas, 585 F. Supp. 403, 407 (N.D. Tex. 1984); James v. KID Broadcasting 
Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1153, 1155-56 (D. Idaho 1983); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Mach., 555 F. 
Supp 730, 732-33 (D.S.C. 1983); Lieb v. Am. Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 127, 139-40 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F. Supp. 115, 117-18 
(M.D. Fla. 1982); Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst. of Metro. Detroit, 510 F. Supp. 722, 
724-26 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent 
Jurisdiction and Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 Am. U.L. Rev. 777 (1983). 
79 See, e.g., Finkle v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989-92 (3d Cir. 1984); Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 675 F.2d 633, 638-40 (5th Cir. 1982); Otero, 598 F.2d at 630-32. 
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inconsistent with the goals or policies of the FTCA. In fact, an earlier 
version of the FTCA gave district courts "exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim against the 
United States,"80 but this was changed in 1948 to allow "exclusive 
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States."81 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia dismissed these arguments, 
stressing that no matter how sensible or convenient pendent jurisdic-
tion might be, the FTCA did not explicitly authorize jurisdiction over 
additional parties. Scalia dismissed the 1948 revision as a "minor 
rewording" of no significance, 82 and, adopting a literalist approach to 
the statutory language, he argued: 
The FTCA, § 1346(b ), confers jurisdiction over "civil actions on 
claims against the United States." It does not say "civil actions on 
claims that include requested relief against the United States," nor 
"civil actions in which there is a claim against the United States"-
formulations one might expect if the presence of a claim against the 
United States constituted merely a minimum jurisdictional require-
ment, rather than a definition of the permissible scope of FICA 
actions. Just as the statutory provision "between ... citizens of differ-
ent States" has been held to mean citizens of different states and no 
one else, ... so also here we conclude that "against the United States" 
means against the United States and no one else. 83 
Notwithstanding this discussion of the language of the FTCA, Jus-
tice Scalia makes clear that the holding goes far beyond the FTCA. 
The opinion concludes by "reaffirm[ing]" that "a grant of jurisdiction 
over claims involving particular parties does not itself confer jurisdic-
tion over additional claims by or against different parties."84 The 
Court's rationale for this broadly stated holding hinges on its percep-
tion that there was an irreconcilable inconsistency between Gibbs and 
the principle that the lower federal courts must have a statutory basis 
for jurisdiction. 85 Rather than attempting to reconcile these lines of 
80 28 u.s.c. § 931 (1946). 
81 Id. § 1346(b) (1952); see Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2009 (1989). 
82 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2009. He also argued that at the time of the 1948 revision "the 
concept of pendent-party jurisdiction was not considered remotely viable." Id. at 2010. 
83 Id. at 2008 (citation omitted). 
84 Id. at 2010. 
85 See id. at 2006 & n.l. 
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authority by finding statutory authorization, 86 the Court described 
Gibbs as "a departure from prior practice" and viewed its task as 
deciding whether pendent-party jurisdiction should be included in the 
Gibbs aberration. 87 The Court chose not to put pendent-party juris-
diction with Gibbs because, according to the Court, pendent-party 
jurisdiction is "fundamentally different" than pendent claim jurisdic-
tion. 88 The Court did not explain how the difference between claims 
and parties was relevant to the issue of pendent jurisdiction, but relied 
instead on the raw assertion that Aldinger and Kroger had already 
established that the Gibbs "exception" did not apply to pendent-party 
jurisdiction. 89 
The Court's treatment of Aldinger and Kroger is at best disingenu-
ous. In Aldinger, the Court had concluded its opinion by stressing 
that it was not striking down all pendent-party jurisdiction. It then 
announced the rule that "[b]efore it can be concluded that such juris-
diction [over a new party not otherwise subject to jurisdiction] exists, 
a federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but 
that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. At one point in his opinion, Scalia hints that 
he understands how one might overcome the supposed lack of statutory authority in Gibbs. 
He states that, with respect to added parties, "we will not assume that the full constitutional 
power has been congressionally authorized." Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007. Nonetheless, Scalia 
asserts that there is a "divergence" between the requirement of statutory authority and Gibbs. 
Id. at 2006 n.l. Justice Stevens' dissent seems to play right into Scalia's characterization of 
Gibbs. Stevens demonstrates that he too understands that statutory authority may be found in 
the phrase "civil actions" in jurisdictional statutes, id. at 2017, but he never persuasively 
confronts the majority's assertion that pendent jurisdiction is inconsistent with the 
requirement for statutory authorization. Instead, he argues, somewhat unhelpfully, that 
pendent jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the requirement for statutory authority because 
"[t]he District Court clearly had jurisdiction over this case and the only question is the scope 
of its authority to consider specific claims." Id. at 2019 n.26. Moreover, Stevens focuses on 
how well-established pendent jurisdiction is rather than on disputing Scalia's premise. See id. 
at 2013-18. As a result, Scalia quotes Stevens as arguing that " '[i]f the Court's demonstration' 
[of lack of statutory authority] 'were controlling, Gibbs, Hurn and Moore, as well as a good 
many other cases, were incorrectly decided.' " Id. at 2006 n.l. The bracketed material is 
Scalia's characterization of Stevens' argument and may not be accurate, because the paragraph 
from which Scalia quotes seems to focus more on the lack of an explicit statutory authority 
specifically directed at pendent jurisdiction. See id. at 2019. Nonetheless, Stevens does not 
dispute Scalia's use of the quotation and the net result is that the dissent seems simply to 
reinforce Scalia's assertion that pendent jurisdiction is inconsistent with the requirement of 
statutory authority. 
87 Id. at 2010. 
88 Id. at 2006. 
89 Id. at 2007. 
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or by implication negated its existence."90 This principle was reiter-
ated in Kroger: 
Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination 
of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the 
specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in 
order to determine whether "Congress in [that statute] has ... 
expressly or by implication negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over 
the particular nonfederal claim.91 
Based on this language, federal courts in nearly every circuit as well 
as commentators had understood the relevant statutory test for all 
pendent jurisdiction to be whether the jurisdictional statute "explic-
itly or by implication negated" pendent jurisdiction.92 Even the gov-
ernment's brief in Finley focused on this as the relevant test.93 
This test is not without its critics and it is not surprising that Jus-
tice Scalia, and maybe some others on the Court as well, would find 
the "negation" test unsatisfactory. Scalia views the search for legisla-
tive intent as highly suspect in general,94 and the prospect of search-
ing for evidence that Congress had implicitly negated jurisdiction 
must have seemed particularly unappealing. Aldinger and the Court's 
subsequent reinterpretation of the legislative history of section 1983 
certainly highlight the difficulty of the test. 95 But if the Court was 
seeking to avoid unnecessary forays into supposed legislative intent, 
the easy solution would have been to interpret "civil actions" as used 
in the jurisdictional statutes as conferring full constitutional author-
90 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). 
91 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (quoting Aldinger, 427 
U.S. at 18). 
92 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 76; Schenkier; supra note 15, at 257. 
93 Brief for the United States at 14-15, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 
87-1973). 
94 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that "[d]isceming the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be 
honest, almost always an impossible task"); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing as unnecessary the 
majority's analysis of the Immigration and Naturalization Act's legislative history because the 
statutory language is clear); Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing committee reports as unreliable 
indicators of legislative intent); D. Farber & P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 
74 Va. L. Rev. 423, 454-55 (1988) (quoting Justice Scalia's Speech on Use of Legislative 
History). 
9S See supra note 55. 
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ity. This was after all the implicit holding of Gibbs, which had found 
supplemental jurisdiction but discussed only constitutional limits on 
power.96 Kroger could be understood as a very limited exception to 
this general rule. As noted earlier, the diversity statute presents a 
unique problem because a full exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction 
would completely eliminate the requirement of total diversity. Thus, 
to construe the diversity statute to require total diversity and also to 
grant supplemental jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Con-
stitution would create an internal inconsistency in the statute. 
Whatever the Court's reasons for disliking the "negation" test,97 
the Court chose not to dignify the test with so much as a decent bur-
ial. Instead, the Court relied on the first half of the sentence in Kroger 
in which the test appears without even quoting the second half, which 
contains the important qualification of asking whether Congress 
" 'expressly or by implication negated' the exercise of jurisdiction over 
the particular nonfederal claim. "98 
96 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
97 The government in its brief suggested that by rejecting pendent-party jurisdiction in this 
case, the Court could avoid a difficult constitutional question. Brief for the United States at 
11-12, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 87-1973). Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit, in rejecting pendent-party jurisdiction, has stated that the "difficulty with pendent-
party jurisdiction is a constitutional one under Article Ill." Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 
1196, 1200 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). Neither the government 
nor the Ninth Circuit clearly describes exactly what this constitutional problem is. While it 
may violate the Constitution for a district court to take jurisdiction over a matter as to which it 
has no statutory authority, that problem disappears if "civil actions" in the jurisdictional 
statutes is interpreted to encompass these types of supplemental jurisdiction. The only other 
constitutional question is whether the Gibbs interpretation of Article III applies only to the 
addition of claims and not to the addition of parties. Although the Court has declined to 
explicitly address this question, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 
n.8 (1978), there is no obvious reason why one would believe that the Constitution 
differentiates between added claims and added parties. Moreover, such an interpretation 
would have significant implications far beyond the facts of this case-it would mean that the 
jurisdiction that federal courts have exercised for years over ancillary parties is in violation of 
Article III. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. Thus, although the Court has 
frequently announced the rule that constitutional questions should not needlessly be addressed, 
see, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1947) (the court should not 
decide a constitutional question unless necessity compels such consideration); Ashwander v. 
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing the canons of interpretation 
justifying the Court's refusal to pass on the constitutionality of an act of Congress), this hardly 
seems an appropriate case in which to invoke that rule, because a narrow decision would do 
nothing to stop the supposed violation of Article III that is occurring routinely in federal 
courts around the country. 
98 See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373 (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18). 
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In his final substantive paragraph, Justice Scalia does proffer an 
explanation of the majority's true concern. That paragraph, which is 
set off from the rest of the opinion, begins by reemphasizing that 
"[t]he Gibbs line of cases was a departure from prior practice" requir-
ing that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred.99 Nonetheless, the Court 
explains, it has "no intent to limit or impair" Gibbs. 100 According to 
the Court, its real concern "is that Congress be able to legislate 
against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know 
the effect of the language it adopts." 101 Thus, the Court concludes 
that it must "reaffirm" that "a grant of jurisdiction over claims 
involving particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over 
additional claims by or against different parties" because "the oppo-
site would sow confusion."102 The Court seems in essence to be say-
ing that it has abandoned any goal of rationalizing the law of 
supplemental jurisdiction and has opted instead to clarify the area 
using arbitrary distinctions. The theme of clarity in the rules of statu-
tory interpretation is one that appears in other Scalia opinions. 103 
Unfortunately, the opinion in Finley creates rather than eliminates 
confusion. Specifically, the Court's rationale in Finley creates a host 
of practical uncertainties as to when a federal court has jurisdiction 
over pendent and ancillary parties and claims. In the short time since 
Finley was decided, the lower courts have predictably demonstrated 
substantial disagreement and confusion about the meaning of Finley. 
Ill. THE IMPACT OF FINLEY 
A. Does Finley Apply to Both Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction? 
At the beginning of his opinion, Justice Scalia describes the issue 
before the Court as whether the FTCA "permits an assertion of pen-
dent jurisdiction over additional parties."104 Later, Justice Scalia dis-
tinguishes other cases on the grounds that they involve "ancillary 




103 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scali~r, J., 
concurring); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1683-84 (1989); United States v. 
Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
104 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005 (emphasis added). 
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jurisdiction."105 Nonetheless, the Court's analysis appears equally 
applicable to most categories of cases that have been traditionally 
labeled "ancillary." 
The Court describes pendent claim jurisdiction as set forth in Gibbs 
as a "departure"106 from the requirement of statutory authority for 
jurisdiction. If the phrase "civil actions" does not include pendent 
jurisdiction, 107 it is not obvious why it should be understood to 
include ancillary jurisdiction. Of course, the classic ancillary claim is 
one raised by the defendant, and there are strong fairness reasons why 
such claims should be allowed. 108 But an underlying premise of Fin-
ley itself is that the needs of fairness cannot override the requirements 
for statutory authorization. 109 Thus, the argument must be not that 
ancillary jurisdiction exists because it is fair, but that fairness con-
cerns lead us to interpret "civil actions" to include ancillary jurisdic-
tion. The difficulty with this is that it suggests that there is statutory 
authorization for jurisdiction over claims lacking an independent 
jurisdictional basis, provided there is a "good enough" reason for 
jurisdiction. However, if this is trne, it is hard to explain how the 
Court could conclude that there is never statutory authority for pen-
dent claims without making any inquiry into the reasons that might 
support such jurisdiction. 
B. Does Finley Apply to All Added Parties? 
In addition to differentiating between pendent and ancillary juris-
diction, the Court distinguished between adding claims and adding 
parties. 110 There are two problems that result from this distinction. 
First, it is not always easy to distinguish between added claims and 
added parties. Second, as to those situations that clearly involve 
added parties, the Court's pronouncements are broadly phrased and 
appear to eliminate jurisdiction in several significant areas in which 
the federal courts have traditionally exercised ancillary jurisdiction. 
ws Id. at 2008 n.4. 
106 ld. at 2010. 
107 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of this concept. 
tos See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text. 
109 See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008 (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 
365, 376-77 (1978)). 
110 Id. at 2007. The Court stated, "[o]ur cases show, however, that with respect to the 
addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume that the full 
constitutional power has been congressionally authorized." Id. 
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The problem of distinguishing between added claims and added 
parties can be illustrated with a hypothetical case based on Kroger. 
Imagine a slight change of the facts in Kroger so that there was diver-
sity between the defendant and the impleaded third-party defend-
ant111 but not between the plaintiff and the third-party defendant. 
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff would not be relying on pen-
dent jurisdiction to bring an entirely new party into the lawsuit, but 
instead, the third-party defendant would have been brought into the 
case on the basis of a claim over which there was an independent basis 
for jurisdiction, namely, diversity. Thus, one could easily character-
ize this case as involving pendent claim rather than pendent-party 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the case does not seem to fit the definition of 
pendent-party jurisdiction offered by the Finley Court-that pendent-
party jurisdiction is "jurisdiction over parties not named in any claim 
that is independently coguizable by the federal court." 112 On the 
other hand, the fortuity of diversity between the defendant and third-
party defendant does not alter the concern articulated in Kroger that 
taking jurisdiction would allow plaintiffs to circumvent the total 
diversity rule. 113 Moreover, at the end of Finley, the Court describes 
Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger as having held that "a grant of jurisdic-
tion over claims involving particular parties does not itself confer 
jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different parties."114 
This language could be read to suggest that the Court would treat the 
hypothetical case as a pendent-party case over which there was not 
jurisdiction, because although there was jurisdiction over the claim 
between the plaintiff and defendant and the claim between the defend-
ant and the third-party defendant, that would not confer jurisdiction 
''by" the plaintiff "against" the third-party defendant. The indetermi-
nacy of the posed hypothetical highlights the potential problems that 
can arise from the Finley Court's failure to articulate a rationale for 
distinguishing between added claims and added parties. 
The second difficulty with the Court's distinction between added 
claims and added parties is that the Court appears to be eliminating 
jurisdiction over all claims involving additional parties, including sit-
lll In Kroger, both the defendant and the impleaded third party were incorporated in 
Nebraska. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 368 (1978). 
112 109 S. Ct. at 2006 (footnote omitted). 
113 See 437 U.S. at 374-75. 
114 109 S. Ct. at 2010. 
1990] Finley v. United States 559 
nations in which the federal courts have traditionally exercised ancil-
lary jurisdiction, such as impleader, 115 intervention of right, 116 class 
actions, 117 joinder of additional parties as part of a compulsory coun-
terclaim 118 or cross-claim. 119 Because in these situations it is usually 
someone other than the plaintiff who seeks to bring in the additional 
party, the jurisdiction is generally labeled "ancillary,"120 but the 
Court's definition of pendent jurisdiction 121 and its description of its 
holding in Zahn, Aldinger, and Kroger, 122 both quoted above, 123 make 
no distinction based on who seeks to bring in the extra party. The 
Finley Court does at one point hint that ancillary parties might be 
treated differently from pendent parties. 124 Yet different treatment for 
ancillary and pendent parties seems inconsistent with the Court's 
assertion that adding parties is always different from adding claims. 
If the explanation for the different treatment of pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction is to go beyond mere linguistics, the Court must have con-
cluded that explicit authority is not necessary for at least some situa-
tions involving added parties. 125 But this conclusion would be flatly 
115 See 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 30, § 1444. As noted earlier, the 
Kroger Court recognized in dicta that there is jurisdiction over claims between a defendant and 
an impleaded third party. See 437 U.S. at 375-76. 
116 See Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1922); 
Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1886); 7A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 
33, § 1917. 
117 Under current doctrine, in a class action only the named class representatives need be 
diverse from the opposing party. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969). This 
doctrine has been described as an exercise of "ancillary" jurisdiction, see Supreme Tribe of 
Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1921), although if the term "ancillary" is used for 
claims joined by someone other than the plaintiff, it is not clear that this is the proper term, at 
least in cases of a plaintiff class action. 
118 See Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329, 333 (1887); 6 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & M. Kane, supra note 30, § 1436; Fraser, supra note 12, at 533-34. 
119 See 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 30, § 1436; Fraser, supra note 12, at 
534. . 
12o On occasion, a plaintiff might respond to a counterclaim by impleading a third party. 
Commentators have suggested that this should be considered ancillary jurisdiction. See supra 
note 12. 
121 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2006. 
122 Id. at 2010. 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 112 & 114. 
124 109 S. Ct. at 2007-08. 
125 There may, of course, be fairness reasons for being more solicitous toward ancillary 
parties that a defendant seeks to join because ordinarily the defendant does not choose the 
federal forum. But such concerns do not give a basis for dispensing with the requirement of 
statutory authority. As the Court itself noted in Finley, " 'neither the convenience of the 
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inconsistent with the Court's position that explicit authorization is 
necessary before parties can be added. 
It is possible that the Court envisioned retaining a very narrow 
exception for ancillary parties. The Court acknowledged that it has 
long found jurisdiction over "a narrow class of cases" involving added 
parties over whom no independent basis of jurisdiction exists where 
that claim is " 'ancillary' to jurisdiction otherwise properly vested-
for example, when an additional party has a claim upon contested 
assets within the court's exclusive control ... or when necessary to 
give effect to the court's judgment."126 Unfortunately, it is unclear 
from this statement whether the Court means to treat all assertions of 
"ancillary party" jurisdiction differently from pendent jurisdiction, or 
if it is only treating differently those categories of ancillary jurisdic-
tion involving exclusively controlled property or those that are neces-
sary to effectuate the judgment. Treating ancillary parties differently 
from pendent parties undermines the premise of the Court's argument 
that additional parties are always treated differently than additional 
claims. 
Whatever arguments the Court might offer for retaining ancillary 
jurisdiction over additional parties in some contexts, 127 two tradition-
ally recognized areas of ancillary jurisdiction seem particularly vul-
nerable to attack using the Finley Court's logic-class actions and 
impleader. 128 
litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine 
of ancillary jurisdiction.'" Id. at 2008 (quoting Kroger, 427 U.S. at 376-77). Moreover, this 
argument completely undermines the result in Finley, because the "fairness" argument in cases 
of exclusive jurisdiction is quite similar to the argument for ancillary jurisdiction. 
126 Id. at 2008. 
127 The Court might, for example, continue to allow ancillary jurisdiction over intervention 
of right under Rule 24(a)(2), which allows intervention "when the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
applicant's ability to protect that interest." Fed R. Civ. P. 24 (a)(2); see Fraser, Ancillary 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts of Persons Whose Interest May Be Impaired if Not Joined, 62 
F.R.D. 483 (1974). There are particularly strong fairness reasons for allowing intervention in 
this context. Moreover, there is Supreme Court authority dating back more than 100 years 
that authorizes ancillary jurisdiction at least where the intervenor claims property within the 
control of the court. See, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). This line of 
cases is cited with apparent approval by the Court in Finley. See 109 S. Ct. at 2008. 
128 In his dissent, Justice Stevens hints that the majority opinion might create problems for 
impleader claims but does not elaborate on the point. 109 S. Ct. at 2020 n.30. 
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1. Class Actions 
Even if the Court were to try to retain jurisdiction in some of these 
situations that have historically been classified under ancillary juris-
diction, the most vulnerable to future attack would seem to be class 
actions. Prior to Finley, the accepted doctrine with respect to class 
actions was that only the named plaintiffs need be diverse from the 
defendants and that the federal court could exercise ancillary jurisdic-
tion over the claims of the nondiverse class members. 129 This rule 
dates back to the case of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble. 130 The 
Supreme Tribe ofBen-Hur was a fraternal benefit association that had 
successfully defended a class action brought on behalf of a group of 
shareholders in federal court. When a disgruntled group of share-
holders filed a second suit in state court seeking to relitigate the same 
issues, the Supreme Tribe filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin 
the state court action. In determining whether the injunction should 
issue, the Supreme Court first had to determine whether the federal 
court in the original class action had jurisdiction where the plaintiff 
class included unnamed class members who were not diverse from the 
defendant. The Court held that there was jurisdiction and that the 
nondiverse class members were bound by the judgment. 131 The Court 
quoted extensively from Stewart v. Dunham, 132 which had allowed 
intervention by a nondiverse party and used the label "ancillary."133 
The Court then announced that the principle of Stewart v. Dunham 
"controls this case."134 Although Ben-Hur could be construed to 
apply only where the class members are asserting a joint interest, 135 it 
has come to be cited for the proposition that there is ancillary juris-
l29 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 162 (2d Cir. 1987); J. 
Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 12, at 742; C. Wright, supra note 2, at 484. 
130 255 u.s. 356 (1921). 
131 Id. at 366. 
l32 115 U.S. 61 (1885), quoted in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 
(1921). 
l33 ld. at 64. 
134 Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. at 365. 
135 The complaint in Ben-Hur had asserted that the plaintiffs all had "a common but 
indivisible interest." 255 U.S. at 361. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has held that class actions proceeding under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) are 
"separate suits" that require each claimant to meet his or her own jurisdictional requirements. 
Steele v. Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 843 (1947). 
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diction over nondiverse class members in all class actions. 13~ This 
broad reading of Ben-Hur was seriously undermined by Zahn v. Inter-
national Paper Co. 137 in which the Court held that all class members 
must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. 138 Nonetheless, 
courts139 and commentators140 have continued to assume that there is 
ancillary jurisdiction over nondiverse class members. 
Even if Ben-Hur survived Zahn, 141 it is hard to see how it can sur-
vive Finley. In Finley, the Court's holding that "a grant of jurisdic-
tion over claims involving particular parties does not itself confer 
jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different partiesm42 
appears to be squarely. applicable to the class-action context. The fact 
that the class-action situation has traditionally been labeled "ancil-
lary" provides scant protection. The application of that label to the 
class-action context is not the result of some considered analysis, but 
simply reflects the fact that Ben-Hur and Stewart ·were decided before 
there was significant development in the concept of pendent jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, the fairness rationale for ancillary jurisdiction, i.e., 
that ancillary jurisdiction is invoked to protect "a defending party 
haled into court against his will,"143 does not apply to class actions. It 
is ordinarily not the defendant who seeks to create a class action, but 
rather the plaintiff. In fact, the defendant frequently objects to the 
certification of a plaintiff class. Thus, even if one were to accept that 
the federal courts should exercise ancillary jurisdiction because of 
compelling concerns about fairness to the defendant, this has no rele-
vance to the analysis of class actions. In sum, it seems likely that 
136 See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 309 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969); J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 
12, at 742; C. Wright, supra note 2, at 484. 
137 414 U;S. 291 (1973). 
138 Id. at 301. 
139 See, e.g., Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance v. Mobile Oil Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1166, 
1168 n.2 (D.C. Idaho 1985) (asserting that only the citizenship of the class representative is 
considered for purposes of determining diversity in a class action). 
140 See, e.g., J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 12, at 742 (noting that "it is 
well settled that only the citizenship of the named representative is considered in determining 
whether federal diversity jurisdiction may be involved"); C. Wright, supra note 2, at 484 ("It 
has long been the rul~ that in class actions only the citizenship of the named representatives is 
to be considered .... This continues to be held under the amended rule."). 
141 For a discussion of the impact of Zahn on the broad reading of Ben-Hur, see Currie, 
supra note 4, at 762-64. 
142 109 S. Ct. at 2010 (emphasis added). 
143 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978). 
1990] . Finley v. United States 563 
Finley marks the end of ancillary jurisdiction over nondiverse class 
members. 
2. Impleader 
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant 
to bring into the litigation a third party "who is or may be liable to 
him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against [him]." 144 It is now 
considered hornbook law that there is ancillary jurisdiction over such 
claims145 and the Supreme Court has described this principle as "well-
established doctrine." 146 
At first glance, impleader might seem to present a compelling case 
for ancillary jurisdiction at least where it is the defendant (as opposed 
to the plaintift) who impleads the third party. As the Supreme Court 
explained in Kroger, a "third-party complaint depends at least in part 
upon the resolution of the primary law suit. Its relation to the origi-
nal complaint is thus not mere factual similarity but logical 
144 Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). 
145 See, e.g., J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 12, at 364 (noting that federal 
courts have gradually extended the concept of ancillary subject-matter jurisdiction to cover 
most claims under Rule 14); C. Wright, supra note 2, at 515 (indicating that as long as there is 
diversity jurisdiction between the original parties, there need be no independent jurisdiction for 
the third-party defendant); 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 30, § 1444. 
146 Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714 (1973); see Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375-76 
(acknowledging that lower courts have often found ancillary jurisdiction in cases of impleader 
and distinguishing claims by a defendant against an impleaded third party from claims by a 
plaintiff against such a party). However well-established the doctrine is now, the doctrine 
developed only after the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., 
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R.R. Co. v. Hall, 70 F.2d 608, 610 (5th Cir. 1934) 
(judgment against impleaded party reversed because the impleaded party did not 
independently satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements); Goldberg, The Influence of 
Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 418-19 (1976) (using the 
impleading of the third-party defendants to demonstrate how the advent of the federal rules 
has changed the test for ancillary jurisdiction). Both courts and commentators have observed 
that as a result of the literal joinder of rules, ancillary jurisdiction has become "much broader 
and much more elastic than it had previously been understood to be." Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. 
Supp. 363, 360 (N.D. Iowa 1959); see Goldberg, supra, at 416-21; Kaplan, Continuing Work 
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 
Harv. L. Rev. 356, 400 (1969). This expansion has occurred with little recognition of the 
doctrinal difficulties. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not and cannot create 
jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. A Supreme Court 
concerned about the statutory foundation for jurisdiction over added parties might view with 
some skepticism doctrines that have developed simply to accommodate the liberal joinder 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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dependence." 147 
Upon closer inspection, the case for ancillary jurisdiction over 
impleader claims is not so compelling. The "logical dependence" 
argument offered in Kroger is weak. It is true that the factual prereq-
uisite to recovery under a third-party claim is that the defendant is 
liable to the plaintiff. 148 This does not explain why the third-party 
claim should be tried in the same court as the underlying dispute. To 
the extent the third-party defendant disputes his liability to the 
defendant, that dispute may focus on issues wholly unrelated to the 
plaintiff's claims-issues such as whether the defendant paid his 
insurance premiums or lied on his application for insurance. Thus, 
there may be no litigation efficiency involved in combining the third-
party claim with the main lawsuit. Put differently, this suggests that 
there may be no inefficiency and, therefore, no unfairness149 in requir-
ing the defendant to litigate his third-party claim in a separate court. 
The defendant might reply that the unfairness results from the fact 
that he may not be able to commence a separate lawsuit against the 
third-party defendant until the defendant's liability has been estab-
lished and the would-be third-party defendant has refused to pay. 
This may mean that for a significant period of time the defendant is 
obligated to the plaintiff but has not yet established that the would-be 
third-party defendant is obligated to reimburse him. 150 
There are several responses to this. First, the argument assumes 
that the suit in state court against the would-be third-party defendant 
cannot be filed until liability for the underlying claim has been estab-
lished. However, this assumption may not be accurate in states that 
allow declaratory judgment actions. Moreover, if a state requires that 
the underlying liability be fully established before the suit for reim-
bursement may proceed, any unfairness is a direct result of the state 
law. There is no reason to alter federal jurisdictional law so as to 
correct a perceived unfairness in state law. The proper remedy in 
such a case is to change the state law. 
The Court in Finley justified its elimination of pendent-party juris-
diction on the grounds that there is "a central distinction ... between 
147 437 U.S. at 376. 
148 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14. 
149 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text for a discussion equating efficiency and 
fairness concerns. 
ISO See Note, supra note 4, at 908. 
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new parties and parties already before the court"151 and that "'the 
addition of a completely new party ... would run counter to the well-
established principle that federal courts ... are courts oflimitedjuris-
diction marked out by Congress.' " 152 This concern seems fully appli-
cable when "a completely new party" is brought into the federal court 
under a third-party complaint as well. 
Even assuming one overcomes the statutory obstacle and allows 
ancillary jurisdiction over at least those impleader claims for which a 
separate lawsuit would be particularly burdensome, some further 
issues remain. For example, removal presents a complication because 
here it is the defendant, and not the plaintiff, who has chosen the 
federal forum. Whatever fairness arguments can be made to support 
jurisdiction over impleader claims when the defendant is involuntarily 
haled into federal court seem far less compelling when the defendant 
selects the forum. The Kroger Court's observation about the plaintiff 
in that case seems fully applicable to a removing defendant: " '[T]he 
efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available without question in the 
state courts.' " 153 One can, of course, argue that unless the court takes 
ancillary jurisdiction, defendants will be discouraged from exercising 
their right to remove and that Congress surely did not intend such a 
result. This argument has force, but it is the same argument that has 
been offered to justify pendent jurisdiction, 154 which was rejected in 
Finley. 155 There is no reason why the courts should be so much more 
concerned about protecting the defendant's right to select a federal 
forum than protecting the plaintiff's right to the same. 
Removal also complicates the analysis of impleader claims raised 
by a plaintiff in response to a compulsory counterclaim. 156 In analyz-
ing the plaintiff's situation, it is not clear whether this should be 
labeled ancillary or pendent. Although it is the plaintiff who is seek-
ing to join the impleader claim, the plaintiff is acting in her capacity 
as defendant to the counterclaim. Moreover, the plaintiff did not 
choose the federal forum. This highlights how fluid and ultimately 
151 109 S. Ct. at 2006 n.2. 
152 Id. at 2007 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). 
153 437 U.S. at 376 (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 
(4th Cir. 1972)). 
154 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
155 109 S. Ct. at 2008 n.5. 
156 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(b). 
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useless the labels "pendent" and "ancillary" are. The fairness con-
cerns that would justify ancillary jurisdiction over the defendant's 
impleader claims in nonremoval cases would seem to justify ancillary 
jurisdiction over plaintiff's impleader claims in cases that have been 
removed. These fairness concerns would be even more compelling 
where the plaintiff's impleader is in response to a compulsory counter-
claim involving a claim over which there is exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion. Yet the statutory analysis needed to support jurisdiction in such 
a case is quite similar to that categorically rejected in Finley. 157 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is a strong argu-
ment that Finley eliminates ancillary jurisdiction over all impleader 
claims. Further, if ancillary jurisdiction survives for any impleader 
situation, the courts will face the difficult task of differentiating 
among impleader cases in a way that is neither arbitrary nor inconsis-
tent with Finley. 
C. Does Finley Affect Pendent and Ancillary Claim Jurisdiction? 
In addition to creating confusion concerning supplemental party 
jurisdiction, Finley also creates confusion with respect to both pen-
dent and ancillary claim jurisdiction. As noted earlier, the statutory 
test articulated in Kroger has been understood to apply in all instances 
of supplemental jurisdiction, regardless of whether that jurisdiction 
involved claims or parties and regardless of whether it was "ancil-
lary" or "pendent."158 Following Kroger, numerous lower courts 
applied its test to traditional pendent claims and on a number of occa-
sions found that Congress had "by implication negated" pendent 
157 In 1988, Congress amended the removal statute to provide: 
If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and 
remand the action to the State court. 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1988). This amendment, might be broadly interpreted to prohibit a plain-
tiff from joining any additional nondiverse defendants including impleaded third-party defend-
ants, but such an interpretation does not appear warranted. The section is addressed to joinder 
that would "destroy subject matter jurisdiction." This language appears to be inapplicable 
where the plaintiff impleads a nondiverse third-party defendant in response to a counterclaim 
over which there is federal question jurisdiction. See H.R. Rep. No. 889, IOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 
73, reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5982, 6034 (indicating that the subsection 
was iutended to prevent "a small enlargement of diversity jurisdiction"). Even if the impleader 
claim is based on state law, the addition of that claim would not seem to destroy subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the original claim or counterclaim. 
158 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
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claim jurisdiction. 159 However, the rationale of Finley makes it 
unclear whether any statutory inquiry is appropriate or necessary for 
traditional pendent-claim jurisdiction. The Court described Gibbs as 
a "departure"160 from the requirement of statutory authority for juris-
diction, although it also asserted "no intent to limit or impair"161 that 
departure. The idea that Finley may eliminate, with respect to pen-
dent claims, the need to consider anything other than the Gibbs con-
stitutional test is reinforced by the Court's complete disregard of the 
language in Kroger that had previously been thought to state the 
proper statutory test. 162 Thus, although Finley virtually eliminated 
pendent-party jurisdiction, it may have increased the availability of 
pendent-claim jurisdiction. 163 
Any reinvigoration of pendent-claim jurisdiction may, however, be 
short lived. By characterizing Gibbs as inconsistent with the require-
ment of statutory authorization of jurisdiction, the Court has in 
essence declared pendent-claim jurisdiction to be an unconstitutional 
159 See, e.g., United States ex. rei. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Davis v. Devereux Found., 644 F. Supp. 482, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Lage v. Thomas, 585 F. 
Supp. 403, 407 (N.D. Tex. 1984); James v. KID Broadcasting Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1153, 1156-
57 (D. Idaho 1983); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Mach., 555 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D.S.C. 1983); 
Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F. Supp. 115, 117-18 (M.D. Fla. 1982); 
Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst. of Metro. Detroit, 510 F. Supp. 722, 724-26 (E.D. Mich. 
1981). 
160 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010. 
161 Id. 
162 See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has in dicta cited 
Finley for the proposition that "[i]n the case of pendent claim jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
has extended jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by Gibbs without conducting a close 
examination of the relevant jurisdictional statutes." Teledyne Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 
1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989). 
163 While on the Court of Appeals, Scalia wrote an opinion in a case in which he upheld a 
district court's refusal to allow a plaintiff to bring a pendent state claim along with her Title 
VII claim. Bouchet v. National Urban League, 730 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Scalia cited 
with approval numerous other cases that had reached a similar result. Id. at 805. Although 
several of these cases had relied on the Kroger statutory test to reach this result, Scalia 
specifically declined to rely on a statutory test. Id. at 806 n.2. Instead, he held that because of 
the differences in the remedies available under state and federal law, it was appropriate to 
dismiss the state claim as a matter of discretion. Id. at 805. Thus, it may be that Scalia 
envisions that the trend toward more restricted use of pendent-claim jurisdiction will continue, 
with the courts undertaking the type of statutory analysis described in Kroger, but labeling 
what they do as an exercise of discretion. On the other hand, in another recent opinion 
written by Justice Scalia, the Court limited the federal courts' discretion to abstain from 
hearing a case based on the so-called Buiford doctrine. New Orleans Public Serv. v. Council of 
New Orleans, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 2508 (1989). 
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usurpation of power. Although the Court specifically declined in Fin-
ley to correct this usurpation, the Court may be laying the foundation 
for eventual elimination of pendent-claim jurisdiction. 164 In effect, 
the Finley Court declared Gibbs brain dead, but refused to discontinue 
life support. One can only wonder how long this can continue. 
The potential ramifications do not end with pendent jurisdiction. If 
pendent-claim jurisdiction lacks any statutory basis, what about tradi-
tional ancillary claims such as compulsory counterclaims165 and 
cross-claims?166 Although it has long been held that jurisdiction 
exists over these claims, that view is subject to the same challenge that 
can be made against pendent claims. Thus, Finley has opened the 
door for the complete elimination of all supplemental jurisdiction 
absent explicit congressional authorization. 167 
Even if the Court retains ancillary jurisdiction for compulsory 
counterclaims and cross-claims, it could cut back on the breadth of 
that doctrine. The courts have come to assume that there is ancillary 
jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims when-
ever the "transaction" test168 set forth in Rules 13(a) and 13(g) is 
met. 169 Under this approach, courts focus on the overlap in evidence 
and the convenience and efficiency of trying the two claims 
together. 170 
164 Interestingly, shortly after Finley was decided, Justice Kennedy cited it for the 
proposition that it has never been the rule that "federal courts, whose jurisdiction is created 
and limited by statute, ... acquire power by adverse possession." Newman-Green, Inc. v. 
Alfonzo-Larrain, 109 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
165 See Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974); 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & 
M. Kane, supra note 30, § 1414; Fraser, supra note 12, at 526-30. 
166 See 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra note 30, § 1433; Fraser, supra note 12, at 
530-31. 
167 Justice Stevens' dissent hints at this potential problem. See 109 S. Ct. at 2020 n. 30 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
168 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) & (g). 
169 See Matasar, supra note 11, at 144. 
170 See, e.g., Sue & Sam Mfg. Co. v. B-L-S Constr. Co., 538 F.2d 1048, 1051-53 (4th Cir. 
1976) (using a four-part test based on the similarity ofissues and evidence, logical relation, and 
possibility for res judicata, to determine whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory); 
Great Lakes Rubber Co. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961) (a 
counterclaim is compulsory where it bears a logical relationship and furthers judicial 
economy); J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, supra note 12, at 352 (noting that the 
principal consideration when determining if a counterclaim is compulsory is whether it is 
efficient and economical to consider it in the same litigation as the main claim). 
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However, the current broad approach is not mandated by Moore v. 
New York Cotton Exchange's "close connection" between the claim 
and counterclaim test. 171 Although the Court in Moore quoted from 
and appeared to construe broadly Equity Rule 30, which required the 
defendant to plead any counterclaim "arising out of the transaction 
which is the subject matter of the suit,"172 the Court also noted that in 
the particular case before it, the claim and counterclaim were so 
closely related "that it only needs the failure of the former to establish 
a foundation for the latter."173 Thus, construing Moore narrowly, the 
Court might allow ancillary jurisdiction over counterclaims or cross-
claims only where a decision on the plaintiff's claims is decisive as to 
the other claims, or where a failure to adjudicate the other claims 
might result in a hollow judgment for the plaintiff. 174 
The foregoing discussion is, of course, simply speculation. The 
Court in Finley says very little about ancillary-claim jurisdiction. 175 
However, in distinguishing cases that had upheld ancillary jurisdic-
tion over additional parties, the Court stressed that these cases 
involved claims to property within the federal court's exclusive con-
trol, or situations in which the additional party was "necessary to give 
effect to the court's judgment."176 This suggests that the Court was 
limiting ancillary-party jurisdiction to situations of necessity. A simi-
171 See Matasar, supra note 11, at 142 (under the facts of Moore, transactional ancillary 
jurisdiction could have been read narrowly); Matasar, supra note 17, at 1412-13 (noting that 
subsequent courts have gone well beyond the relatively narrow ruling in Moore). 
172 Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609 (1926). 
173 Id. at 610. 
174 See Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 
262, 273-75 (1968). This narrower approach to ancillary jurisdiction would be consistent with 
§ 22(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. That section provides that a defendant 
is precluded from bringing a claim against a plaintiff in a subsequent action if "[t]he 
relationship between the [defendant's] counterclaim and the plaintiff's claim is such that 
successful prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair 
rights established in the initial action." Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 22(2)(b) (1982). 
Preclusion is necessary in this situation in order to preserve the integrity of the judgment. 
Ancillary jurisdiction would also seem to be necessary because defendants in such cases will 
either lose their counterclaims with no opportunity to pursue them, or the preclusion rule must 
be abandoned with a resulting threat to the integrity of the judgment. Id. 
175 The only reference that seems to address ancillary claim jurisdiction is a footnote in 
which the Court states that Moore is inapplicable because it involved an added claim, not an 
added party. 109 S. Ct. at 2006 n.2. 
176 Id. at 2008. 
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lar limitation could be applied with respect to ancillary-claim 
jurisdiction. 
D. Disarray in the Lower Courts 
Whatever the ambiguities of Finley concerning ancillary- and pen-
dent-claim jurisdiction, one might have hoped it at least would have 
clarified the treatment of classic pendent-party cases. Yet even in 
these cases the opinion is unclear and has already produced an 
extraordinary range of lower court opinions. Some courts have con-
tinued to analyze pendent-party jurisdiction as if Finley changed 
nothing. 177 Two cases have even cited Finley for the proposition that 
the proper statutory inquiry is whether the statute expressly or 
impliedly negates jurisdiction.178 The Ninth Circuit has recently 
upheld pendent-party jurisdiction in a case removed under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, 179 which is somewhat surprising 
177 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989), amending 875 F.2d 979 (1st 
Cir. 1989); Armstrong v. Edelson, 718 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1989); 640 Broadway 
Renaissance Co. v. Cuomo, 714 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Rodriguez aiiowed the 
joinder of a pendent-party plaintiff in a § 1983 action. Mr. Rodriguez sued a municipality 
under § 1983 seeking damages for a wrongful arrest. Mrs. Rodriguez joined in the suit 
aiieging that she suffered emotional distress as a result of her husband's arrest, and she sought 
damages under both § 1983 and state law. The district court dismissed her federal claim but 
retained her as a pendent-party plaintiff based on the state claim. Foiiowing judgments for 
both Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
affirmed. The court's initial opinion was released a few days after Finley without citation to 
that case. Several months later the court amended its opinion to include discussion of Finley, 
but reaffirmed its conclusion that there was pendent-party jurisdiction. The court reasoned 
that unlike the FTCA, the jurisdictional grant under § 1343(a) is "open-ended-applying to 
any person and over any civil action." Rodriguez, 888 F.2d at 906. But the language of 
§ 1343(a) is not as broad as the court suggests. Section 1343(a)(3) allows any civil action by 
any person "[t]o redress the deprivation ... of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the 
Constitution ... or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) 
(1982). Thus, in keeping with Scalia's style of argument, one could say that the statute aiiows 
suits by people who seek to redress a federal right and no one else. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 
2010. 
Interestingly, the court in Rodriguez assumed, without analysis, that the case should be 
treated as a pendent-party case. See 888 F.2d at 900. The court could, however, have avoided 
Finley and stiii upheld jurisdiction by treating this as a pendent-claim case. Mrs. Rodriguez 
did have a federal claim, and, although that claim was dismissed, it may have been sufficiently 
nonfrivolous to support a pendent claim. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) 
(noting that only when a claim is "whoily insubstantial" or "obviously frivolous" wiii the 
federal courts be without the power to entertain the claim). 
178 Armstrong, 718 F. Supp. at 1376; Cuomo, 714 F. Supp. at 690. 
179 Teledyne, Inc. v. Kane Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1989). In Teledyne, a 
Canadian corporation brought suit in California state court against a private Finnish 
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because prior to Finley, the Ninth Circuit was the only court to reject 
categorically pendent-party jurisdiction. 180 Other courts have 
acknowledged that Finley cuts back on pendent-party jurisdiction, but 
seem to find it hard to believe that the Court really meant to eliminate 
completely this useful doctrine and hence have struggled to distin-
guish the facts of Finley. 181 Still other courts have simply assumed 
that Finley eliminated pendent-party jurisdiction altogether. 182 At 
least one district court has acknowledged that the language and 
rationale of Finley threatened ancillary jurisdiction over impleader 
claims. 183 Interestingly, the court seemed reluctant to reach this con-
clusion in light of what it described "compelling policy considera-
tions" in support of ancillary jurisdiction.184 However, after 
analyzing Finley, the court concluded that: 
For these reasons, the ancillary jurisdictional basis for the third 
party claims ... may have been caught in the wide swath Finley cut 
into supplemental jurisdiction. While the Finley majority may well 
corporation and two state-owned Finnish corporations. The entire case was removed under 
§ 144l(d), which provides that "[a]ny civil action brought in a State court against a foreign 
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state." 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 144l(d). The court held that this language was unlike the relevant statutory language at 
issue in Finley and did authorize pendent-party jurisdiction. The court reasoned that a broad 
reading of the statute was appropriate in light of the legislative history and the fact that at the 
time the statute was drafted "pendent party jurisdiction was considered a good deal more than 
a 'remote' possibility." Teledyne, 892 F.2d at 1409. (There is some irony in this latter 
argument, given that less than a year after the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was passed, 
the Ninth Circuit held that pendent jurisdiction was unconstitutional. See Ayala v. United 
States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978)). The Court 
concluded that in granting jurisdiction over "any civil action ... against a foreign state," 28 
U.S.C. § 144l(d), "Congress meant precisely what it said" and hence extended jurisdiction 
over additional parties. Teledyne, 892 F.2d at 1410. Of course, if this language means what it 
says, it seems equally plausible to assert that § 1331, which extends jurisdiction over all civil 
actions arising under federal law, likewise includes additional parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
t8o See carpenters S. Calif. Admin. Corp. v. D & L camp Constr. Co, 738 F.2d 999, 1000 
(9th Cir. 1984); Ayala, 550 F.2d at 1197. 
181 See Bruce v. Martin, 724 F. Supp. 124, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
182 See, e.g., Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643 n.5 (2d Cir. 1989); North 
Star Contracting Corp. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 723 F. Supp. 902, 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); 
Microcomputer Workshops Corp. v. Mindscape, Inc., No. 89 C 2188, at 6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 
1989) (Lexis, Genfed library, Dist. file); Brown v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 717 F. Supp. 
195, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Birkinshaw v. Armstrong World Indus., 715 F. Supp. 126, 127 
(E.D. Pa. 1989). 
183 Community Coffee Co. v. MIS Kriti Amethyst, 715 F. Supp. 772, 773-74 (E.D. La. 
1989). 
184 ld. at 773. 
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have intended to address specifically the pendent party jurisdiction 
problem, the opinion's sweeping language is undeniable. Thus, its 
effect on supplemental jurisdiction in general is potentially far-
reaching.185 
In light of the disarray in the lower courts, it seems likely that over 
the next few years the Supreme Court will be dogged with questions 
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and that there will be ample 
opportunity for the Court to elaborate on Finley, should it so choose. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Finley opinion has the potential to unsettle important areas of 
federal jurisdiction long regarded as well-established. Of course, 
whatever mischief this creates can be corrected by Congress, although 
Congress may have its hands full for a while dealing with the other 
statutory interpretation from this term. 186 
Even beyond the opinion's effect, it's style of argument is troubling. 
The Court demonstrates no apparent discomfort with its conclusion 
that, in exercising pendent-claim jurisdiction, the federal courts have 
acted without any statutory foundation. This broad condemnation of 
all pendent jurisdiction may suggest that this Court is disinclined to 
rationalize the doctrines of its predecessors and instead comes easily 
to the conclusion such doctrines are ill-conceived. Indeed, in the last 
decade, the Court has explicitly and implicitly overruled a number of 
cases187 and even more often disavowed significant reasoning from 
other cases. 188 The overruling or disregard of precedent is not, of 
course, a new phenomena. However, it is relatively unusual for the 
Court to announce that the federal courts have been unconstitution-
185 Id. at 774 (footnote omitted). 
186 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 (1989) (holding that 
racial harassment in course of private employment is not actionable under § 1981); Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonic, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2121 (1989) (statistical evidence in racial makeup 
of work force did not establish prima facie case of disparate impact in violation of Title VII). 
187 See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468,476-78 
(1987); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1986), and other cases in Eskridge, 
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1427, 1430-31 (1988). 
188 See, e.g., Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442-44 (1987); 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-34 (1987) and other cases 
in Eskridge, supra note 187, at 1435-37. 
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ally usurping power for years. 189 Some may applaud the Court's hon-
esty, but others, myself included, share the sentiment of then-
Professor Frankfurter who in reacting to a similar pronouncement in 
Erie exclaimed, "How fluid it all makes the Constitution!" 190 
189 Interestingly, although the Court indirectly acknowledges that pendent jurisdiction 
dates back to at least 1909, see Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), in discrediting 
that doctrine, the Court labels it as "[t]he Gibbs line of cases," id at 2010, thereby linking the 
doctrine to the 1966 decision. Likewise, the Court does not acknowledge that since Gibbs the 
validity of pendent-claim jurisdiction has been repeatedly reaffirmed without anyone on the 
Court questioning it. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 n.l5 
(1986); id. at 823 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). The 
most recent such occasion occurred only last term. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 
U.S. 343, 348-50 (1988). One can only wonder whether this Court found it easier to discredit a 
doctrine by portraying it not only as an historical aberration, but one promulgated by the 
Warren Court. 
190 M. Freedman, supra note 2, at 456, quoted in C. Wright, supra note 2, at 355 n.12. 
